Published by the Philippine Daily Inquirer on 03 September 2026
https://opinion.inquirer.net/194201/why-the-coast-guard-needs-a-governance-overhaul

When the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) was transferred to civilian authority in 1998, it had roughly 3,000 personnel. Today, it is a nationwide armed and uniformed service with an expanding fleet, a growing aviation arm and a mandate encompassing search and rescue, marine environmental protection, maritime law enforcement, disaster response, maritime domain awareness and the defense of Philippine sovereign rights at sea.

That is significant growth. But growth is not the same as maturity, and the harder question is one we have not yet asked as a nation: Has the system that governs the Coast Guard grown at the same pace as the Coast Guard itself?

I do not believe it has. The answer, I believe, is a Philippine Coast Guard Commission.

Republic Act No. 9993 established the PCG as an armed and uniformed service attached to what is now the Department of Transportation (DOTr) and set out its powers and functions. Republic Act No. 12122, enacted in 2025, amended Section 5 of that law to set the commandant’s term at a maximum of three years and prescribe the qualifications for the post. Together, these laws provide the Coast Guard’s framework for command and administration.

But command and governance are not the same.

Command directs operations. It moves ships, launches aircraft, prosecutes cases and saves lives. Governance does something slower and less visible: It keeps an institution professional, accountable, merit-based and capable of performing its mission across generations of leadership.

The commandant must command the Coast Guard. That is not in question.

The question is who provides dedicated, continuous and long-term oversight of the institution itself: its professionalization, personnel systems, career development, organizational standards and institutional performance.

Today, those responsibilities are scattered among the Department of Transportation, the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Audit and the Office of the Ombudsman. Each exercises a part of that oversight within its constitutional or statutory mandate.

None is dedicated to the long-term institutional development of the Philippine Coast Guard. That is the gap. It is not anyone’s failure; it is simply nobody’s job.

The external check that does not exist

There is one consequence of this arrangement that is almost never discussed publicly, and it sits at the top of the organization.

Under Article VII, Section 16, of the Constitution, the Commission on Appointments confirms a defined first category of presidential appointees — department heads, ambassadors and officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain.

In Manalo v. Sistoza (1999), the Supreme Court held that the Philippine National Police (PNP) is separate and distinct from the Armed Forces of the Philippines, that senior police officers therefore fall outside that category and that Congress cannot enlarge the Commission on Appointments’ confirmation power by statute. The provisions of Republic Act No. 6975 that required confirmation of senior PNP appointments were struck down.

The same constitutional reasoning applies to the Coast Guard. The PCG is an armed and uniformed service, but it is not part of the AFP. It is attached to the Department of Transportation. Its flag officers are appointed by the President and assume their commands without passing through the Commission on Appointments.

I raise this not as a complaint. The doctrine is sound, and a Coast Guard whose promotions were negotiated through a bicameral confirmation body would not necessarily be better served. But the institutional consequence deserves to be stated plainly.

In the AFP, the ascent to flag rank passes through legislative scrutiny, however imperfect. In the PNP, appointments and promotions to senior ranks are subject to the standards, examinations and administrative oversight of the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM).

In the Philippine Coast Guard, neither mechanism exists. Once an officer approaches flag rank, the standards that carried that officer there are almost entirely internal, and the only sustained external review available is whatever the DOTr, Civil Service Commission and Commission on Audit can provide under mandates designed for other purposes.

The point is not that our flag officers are unworthy. Many have served with distinction under difficult conditions.

The point is that an organization now entrusted with sovereign responsibilities at sea should not have to rely on the good faith of each administration to ensure that its most senior appointments rest on transparent, competency-based and publicly defensible criteria. Good faith is not a system.

The choice, then, is not between a political gate and no gate at all. It is between leaving the question unanswered and building a professional mechanism.

The lesson of Napolcom

The Philippines has done this before.

Under Republic Act No. 8551, Napolcom was strengthened as the body responsible for the administration and control of the PNP, with statutory functions covering policy, manpower allocation, recruitment, selection, promotion and retirement standards, qualifying examinations, inspection and accountability.

The point is not to copy Napolcom’s structure onto the Coast Guard. The point is the principle behind it: A large uniformed service benefits from specialized institutional governance that sits apart from its operational chain of command.

The PNP has its chief; Napolcom exercises administrative oversight. Both survive changes in leadership.

A Philippine Coast Guard Commission would follow the same principle, adapted to a maritime service with its own character. It would govern the institution. The commandant would command the service.

Concretely, a commission could give the PCG what no single administration can guarantee on its own: competency-based career development and specialized career tracks; long-term manpower planning and succession management; periodic reviews of whether the PCG’s structure and capabilities still match the threats it faces; standards for leadership, technical competency, ethics, certification and the qualifications attached to flag rank and command; organizational assessments that identify systemic weaknesses without duplicating the Civil Service Commission, Commission on Audit or Ombudsman; and a long-term institutional development plan covering education, leadership, infrastructure, fleet, aviation and technology.

Its limits matter just as much.

The commission must never become a second operational headquarters. It should not issue operational orders, control the deployment of vessels or aircraft, interfere with search and rescue or law enforcement, replace or shadow the commandant, duplicate existing oversight bodies or serve as a doorway for political interference.

Remove any one of those safeguards, and the idea becomes worse than the problem it was meant to solve.

Policy recommendation

Reform of this kind should be evolutionary. Three phases would get us there.

First, the Department of Transportation — the department to which the PCG is attached — can establish an interim Coast Guard governance and professionalization body within its existing authority.

Its work would be diagnostic: assess the current governance system, identify personnel and organizational gaps, review promotion and career development, study the Napolcom experience, consult the Coast Guard community and produce a comprehensive framework for a permanent commission.

Second, once that framework is validated, the President can issue an executive order formalizing an interim governance mechanism at the national level, directing agency participation and requiring the preparation of a proposed Philippine Coast Guard Commission Act for submission to Congress.

This would test the model before it is set in law. But an executive order is transitional by nature; it cannot outlive the administration that signs it.

Third, and most important, Congress must legislate.

A Philippine Coast Guard Commission Act should define the commission’s mandate and powers; its relationship with the President, Department of Transportation and commandant; the qualifications and tenure of its commissioners; its role in professional standards and promotion oversight; its inspection and strategic planning functions; its reporting and budget requirements; and, explicitly, the safeguards that protect operational command.

Why now

The maritime environment confronting the country has changed, and it is not changing back.

The Coast Guard now operates at the intersection of maritime safety, national security, international law, sovereignty, environmental protection, disaster resilience and economic security. The West Philippine Sea alone illustrates why the Philippines needs a Coast Guard that is not merely larger but institutionally credible and resilient.

Ships and aircraft are essential. But hardware alone does not produce institutional maturity. That requires people, professional standards, leadership development, meritocracy, accountability and planning that extends beyond any single term.

A modern Coast Guard cannot depend on the quality of individual commandants. Good leaders come and go; professional systems must outlast them.

As the PCG grows, so do the consequences of fragmented governance, and the cost of maintaining the status quo will eventually exceed the cost of reform.

The Philippine Coast Guard has proved it can grow. The next task is to make sure its governance grows with it — not to control the Coast Guard, but to strengthen it; not to command its operations, but to professionalize the institution behind them. 

About the Author: 
Vice Adm. Joseph M. Coyme, PCG (Ret.), Ph.D., is chair and founding director of the Philippine Archipelagic Sea Lanes Center Inc. (PASLCI). He is a member of PMA “Bantay-Laya” Class of 1994 and retired after 35 years in the Philippine Coast Guard as the 28th commander of the Maritime Safety Services Command.